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Brexit and the UK-Africa Caribbean and Pacific Aid (ACP) Relationship  
 
 
Abstract  
Debates about Brexit draw on powerful discursive mechanisms that have 
important implications for the UK–Africa, Caribbean and Pacific aid relationship. 
Some of these narratives can be characterized in the following ways: First, that 
Brexit is an opportunity to recreate a Global Britain after a period of EU 
membership that saw the UK neglect its former partners, particularly the 
Commonwealth. Second, the costs of EU membership are profligate and these 
funds could be better utilized by the national government. Third the Brexit 
‘divorce bill’ is a penalty exacted by the EU for the UK’s decision to leave. This 
article explores these claims via the EU-ACP relationship, and proposes three 
counter arguments. First, the discourse of ‘neglect’ overlooks the external 
relationships the UK has maintained through EU membership. Second, these 
relationships have provided ‘value for money’ for the UK. Third, these 
contributions represent a significant proportion of the Brexit ‘divorce bill’ and 
are on-going financial commitments that the UK was central to establishing. The 
article then reviews the potential impact of Brexit on UK aid, arguing that rather 
than reinvigorating Global Britain Brexit threatens to undermine the UK’s 
position in global development, current levels of aid and longstanding 
commitments to eradicate poverty.   
 
Policy Implications:  
1. Brexit will reconfigure the position of the UK in Global Development.   
2. Brexit will have implications for the EU-Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific relationship  
3. Brexit could undermine current levels of UK aid, both in terms of 
absolute volume of funds and its geographical reach 
4. Brexit could undermine the longstanding commitments to eradicate 
poverty   
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Introduction  
The Brexit referendum and the subsequent negotiations have given rise to 
powerful discursive mechanisms that are both directly and indirectly linked to 
the UK’s development policy and aid provision. The first of these is that due to 
its membership of the EU the UK has neglected its relationship with the 
Commonwealth (Price 2016). This discourse however neglects the longstanding 
relationship that the UK has maintained with the Commonwealth and other 
states across the Global South through its membership of the EU. The 
‘partnership’ between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group 
has long been the centerpiece of the EU’s development cooperation relations. 
Of the 53 Commonwealth states, only 11 are not part of the EU-ACP relationship. 
The pre-referendum discourse therefore represents a ‘myth of betrayal’ 
(Murray-Evans 2016) which underestimates the significance of the range of the 
EU’s external relations, and the UK’s role within these. 
 
The second powerful discourse relates to the costs of UK membership, which 
formed a key strand in the Leave Campaign. Controversially this was calculated 
as a cost to the UK of £350 million per week, which it was argued, was a wasteful 
contribution to a profligate centralized bureaucracy that could be more 
effectively spent by the national government in the interest of the British public. 
The calculation of this sum has been contested (and subsequently denied by its 
one-time promoters).  However, the UK’s financial contribution to the EU has 
been a source of tension in the Brexit negotiations and a key point in the ongoing 
pro-Brexit debate.  In contrast to this, the argument here is that the UK’s 
contribution to the EU aid budget has represented good ‘value for money’ for 
the UK government and allowed it to leverage UK aid while affording the UK a 
central role in the management of global development and the alignment of 
development policy and practice at the global, regional and national levels. This 
is particularly the case in relation to the EU’s key development cooperation 
relations with 79 states of the Global South that form the ACP group.  The UK 
has been an important actor in this relationship, since its accession to the EU in 
early 1970s. 
 
Finally, in the Brexit negotiations the question of the amount the UK could be 
required to pay as part of its arrangements to leave the EU has been 
characterized as a ‘divorce bill’ through which the EU has attempted to exact a 
harsh penalty in revenge for the UK’s decision to leave. Through a focus on UK 
contributions to EU aid mechanisms, such as the European Development Fund 
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(EDF), this article will argue instead that the ‘divorce bill’ represents 
longstanding and on-going financial commitments that, in the case of aid 
provision at least, the UK has played a leading role in establishing.  
 
After exploring each of these three Brexit claims in the first section of this article, 
the second section will review the potential impact of Brexit on UK Aid relations. 
It will suggest that withdrawal of the UK from the EU is likely not only to be a 
costly and uncertain process, but also one that threatens to undermine the UK’s 
position in global development, current levels and sources of development 
funding and existing and nascent trade relations. It will explore the possible aid 
provision strategies the UK could adopt on departure from the EU, and suggests 
that continued engagement with the EU-ACP partnership would be a possible 
and perhaps optimal outcome.  
 
The Myth of Betrayal: EU- ACP Partnership as a Framework for UK Aid  
 
Both in the run up to the Brexit referendum and in the subsequent discussions 
about of the reformulation of the UK’s post-EU external relations, there has 
been much recourse to the rhetoric of a lost empire and the imaginings of the 
UK’s Global power. For example, James Carver UKIP MEP for the West Midlands 
argues that the Commonwealth was ‘forsaken’ when the UK joined the EU 
(Carver 2016), while Boris Johnson argued UK-Commonwealth relations were 
‘betrayed’ through the UK’s accession (cited in Dominiczak 2013). Membership 
of the EU has been constructed as a ‘betrayal’ of the Commonwealth, with Brexit 
being presented as a moment to re-engage with the world beyond Europe and 
to reinvigorate the global role of the UK. This is exemplified by the UK’s post –
EU trade deals with the Commonwealth acquiring the informal label ‘Empire 
2.0.’ (The Times 2017)  
 
Both Murray–Evans (2016) and Price (2016) countered the argument that EU 
membership caused UK parochialism by pointing to the longstanding global 
relationships the UK has conducted through its membership of the EU, with 
Murray-Evans (2016) arguing that the narrative of the Commonwealth’s 
betrayal was a ‘myth’. What is highlighted is the accommodation of the UK’s 
relationships with its colonies and former colonies in its accession to the then 
EEC in 1974. While the EU (then EEC) had made provision for the 
accommodation of France’s and Belgium’s colonies and former colonies via the 
Treaty of Rome, and later through the Yaoundé conventions, the accession of 
the UK to the then EEC necessitated a reorientation of these relationships (Nunn 
and Price 2004). Britain brought with it an array of ties to the Commonwealth, 
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and in conditions of economic crisis and challenges to its competitiveness, 
accession to the EEC offered the UK an opportunity to both collectivise its 
obligations to some of these states while at the same time opening news areas 
of opportunity, such as Francophone Africa, which had previously been beyond 
its reach.  
 
Prior to its accession, the UK had operated systems of preferential trade with its 
colonies and former colonies based on quota arrangements for certain 
commodities. Aid had been provided as grants and loans for both financial and 
technical assistance. After the UK’s accession, the Lomé Convention replaced 
the existing development cooperation agreements with states in the Global 
South. The result was that the former colonial ties of the existing member states, 
particularly France and Belgium, were merged with those of the UK to form the 
Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific states into single negotiating bloc, the ACP 
Group. Trade provisions within the relationship were based on non-reciprocal 
preferential trade agreements, commodity stabilization mechanisms and the 
provision of development assistance ‘with no strings attached’.  
 
Over time, the EU-ACP relationship came under pressure to reform and 
liberalise, both in terms of its trade relationship and in the orientation of the aid 
provision, marked by the replacement of the Lomé Conventions with the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000.  The provision of aid had shifted from 
‘project’ to ‘programmed aid’, becoming increasingly conditional on structural 
adjustment commitments, good governance, respect for human rights, 
democracy and transparency, and with a specific focus on Aid for Trade (AfT) 
and Private Sector Development (PSD). Non-reciprocal trade arrangements 
were transformed ultimately into Free Trade Arrangements between the EU and 
regional groupings with the ACP, known as Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs).  As such, through a single EU development cooperation partnership and 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the UK has been at the heart of a complex 
web of trade relations that link it to 79 ACP states and seven regional trade 
organisations across the Global South.  The Brexit discourse of Commonwealth 
betrayal through British accession to the EU is therefore open to contestation. 
Moreover, as the longest standing and most comprehensive of all EU 
development cooperation agreements, the EU-ACP relationship has formed the 
cornerstone of the EU’s Development Cooperation relationships since the early 
1970s, and acted as a blueprint for the wide range of agreements that link the 
EU, and thereby the UK, to states and regions across the world.  
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UK Aid: Value for money though EU contributions.  
A key debate that shaped the run up to the referendum was the controversial 
and contested claims about the costs of EU membership, with the Leave 
campaign focusing on sum of £350 million per week and the ways in which this 
could be more effectively used within the national budget. Underpinning this 
discourse were claims of EU profligacy and waste, with for example the UKIP 
MEP Jonathan Arnott characterizing the EU as a financial ‘sinkhole’ (Arnott 
quoted by Hall 2016).  
 
A focus on UK contributions to EU development cooperation funds provides a 
useful lens through which to analyse some of the claims in relation to the costs 
of membership. The funding mechanism for EU-ACP aid is the European 
Development Fund (EDF), which has a special status and is managed outside of 
the EU budget. This is an inter-governmental fund, which Member states and 
other donors contribute to directly. The EDF has been described by DFID (2013) 
as providing ‘significant support to Commonwealth countries’. The current 11th 
EDF runs from 2014-2020, has a commitment to the provision of €30.5 billion 
(as an overall envelope) and is based on the objectives of poverty eradication, 
sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP states into the 
world economy (European Commission 2013). The previous EDF, which ran from 
2008-2013, provided €22 .7 billion (UK Government 2013).  
 
The UK has historically been a key contributor to the EDF. Its overall contribution 
to the 11th EDF is scheduled to be €4.5 billion euros, which amounts to 
approximately 15% of the total EDF and makes the UK the third largest 
contributor (after Germany with €6.28 billion euros, 20.6% of the total EDF, and 
France with €5.43 billion euros, 17.8% of the total EDF) (Ransome 2016, EU 
Commission 2013; DFID 2013). Annually, these contributions are significant. In 
2013 UK contributions to the 10th EDF were £407m, representing 8.7% of total 
share of UK Multilateral ODA (DFID 2016). In 2014 its contribution was £328 
million, representing 6.7% of its multilateral funding (DFID 2017), and in 2015 its 
contribution was £392million, amounting to 8.8% of total share of multilateral 
funding (DFID 2017). Importantly, due to the funding cycle, member state 
contributions are due in 2018 for the 2014-2020 EDF, underlining the political 
implications of Brexit ‘divorce’ settlement for the funding of ACP development.  
 
In addition to the EDF, investment loans are provided to the ACP by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). The UK is currently the biggest investor in the 
EIB, with 17% of EIB capital. Again there has been little overt discussion of the 
future of these funds post-Brexit. The funding mechanisms for the EU-ACP 
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relations are additional to those the UK provides to the European Commission 
for development cooperation programmes in non-ACP areas, such as Asia and 
Latin America, and humanitarian aid financing. In 2014 the UK channeled £1.13 
billion aid funds through the European Commission, of its total aid budget of 
£11.73 billion (Miller 2016, p. 148).  
 
Within DFID there has recently been a strong focus on achieving value for money 
in aid provision. However, Watkins (2016) has argued that UK contributions to 
the EDF have represented a good investment as it extends the geographic reach 
of UK aid, including to areas where the UK has a limited and declining aid 
presence. This position was shared by the UK Government (2013) itself which 
stated that through the collectivization of aid provision in the EU, the ‘reach and 
magnitude of EU financial instruments’ (which includes the EDF) ‘outweighs 
those the UK could bring to bear bilaterally’. DFID (2013) stated that the EDF 
‘provides a means of engagement in a number of countries that the Department 
for International Development does not currently operate in directly, but which 
are nonetheless countries with high levels of poverty’. This has allowed the UK 
to maximise the use of its resources, allowing it in times of austerity to focus 
‘scarce national resources on priorities elsewhere’ (UK Government 2013).   
 
The UK has been able to leverage EU aid to enhance DFID’s objectives and its 
own national goals, for example poverty reduction, the 0.7% Gross National 
Income (GNI) aid commitment and social development policies. Its status as one 
of the largest EDF contributors and the role it has occupied more generally in 
the EU, has secured the UK’s leading position in defining EU development 
cooperation policy and practice. DFID (2014 cited in Miller 2016) recognised this 
in its assessment of how the UK uses its position in the Council of the EU to 
influence EU development policy. Olivie and Perez (2017, p.21) also state that 
UK policy makers consider themselves to be ‘determinant actors in allocating EU 
aid to LDCs, raising awareness of gender issues, and introducing transparency as 
well as “result-orientation” in aid management. They see the EU as a catalyst for 
their own aid’ (Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 21). 
 
The UK’s effectiveness in securing its objectives within EU policy is evident in, 
for example, the inclusion of a greater focus on the impact, monitoring and 
evaluation of aid programmes (DFID 2013). The inclusion of social development 
policies coupled with trade liberalization in the Cotonou Agreement and the 
increasing emphasis on Aid for Trade (AfT) also bear the hallmark of UK 
preferences, particularly under Peter Mandelson and the New Labour 
Government. Andrew Sherriff, Head of European External Action Programme 
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argued that: 
The UK has had an influence on the EU’s focus and expertise on the 0.7% 
target for aid, the SDGs, the value for money and results agenda, 
differentiation in EU aid to focus more on least development countries 
and fragile states (ECPDM 2016). 
 
As such DFID’s 2013 Multilateral Aid Review stated that the EDF represented 
‘very good value for money due to its close alignment with UK development 
objectives and its critical role in meeting international development objectives’ 
(DIFD 2013).  
 
The role that the UK has played in EU development policy has allowed it to 
secure the coherence between national, regional and global institutions and 
policymaking, giving it a key role in inter-scalar alignment. The UK was at the 
forefront of coordinating EU development assistance in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals, the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the post -
2015 Agenda. It has been able to forge partnerships with ‘like-minded’ states to 
develop a collective approach that coordinates between national and regional 
levels and promotes a particular form of development, maximizing the benefits 
and efficiency of coordination (Watkins 2016). The UK government’s own 
assessment of this cooperation argues that the EU is ‘effective where Member 
states, in particular the UK, France and/or Germany, are fully aligned and driving 
policy’ (UK Government 2013).  This is particularly significant given the EU’s 
position as the World’s largest donor, providing half of all international aid 
(Watkins 2016; UK Government 2013).  
 
The UK government’s 2013 report concluded that it was ‘generally strongly in 
the UK’s interests to work through the EU’ as this provided both ‘strength in 
numbers’ and an avenue for the UK to operationalize its politics within the EU 
to give it more influence internationally (UK Government 2013). Additional 
benefits were the size and economic weight of the single market which provides 
reach in a number of areas of external action, as well as a ‘commercial benefit’ 
for the UK from EU trade agreements. Importantly the operation of 
development cooperation policy through the EU has allowed the UK to offset 
the challenges to its own competitiveness, and to that of the EU. For example in 
2013 the Senior European Experts Group stated that statistics about the 
strength of the UK economy, such as it being seventh largest economy, ‘flattered 
to deceive’, and that by working through the EU the UK was able to maintain 
influence and prosperity ‘in an era where the relative balance of global growth, 
population and power is moving away from the UK and Europe’ (UK Government 
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2013).  
 
The weight of evidence and opinion outlined by the UK government itself 
emphasizes the benefits to the UK from cooperating and collectivizing its 
development cooperation relations. In doing so it has maximized scarce 
resources (particularly in a climate of financial crisis and austerity), secured a 
leading role in structuring development policy and coordination at the regional, 
inter-regional and global level, and addressed concerns about its own 
competitiveness. Smith (2016) argues that through coordination with the EU, 
the UK has been able to ‘punch above its weight’, and that outside of the EU it 
will struggle to have the same level of global reach and influence. Moreover the 
relative loss to the UK will be greater than to the EU: 
The UK will not be able to sell itself to non-EU states as a “pivotal 
power” or a “bridge to the EU” as it has in the past, because it will no 
longer be able to deliver the support of other EU member states (Smith 
2016).  
 
In sum, the provision of aid through the EU has represented good value for 
money for the UK government, providing it with significant agency in the shaping 
of the political economies of Commonwealth states and in the wider Global 
South.  While this has involved the UK making significant contributions to the EU 
aid budget, these have resulted from UK decisions about external priorities and 
have enabled the UK to leverage other Member States’ aid budgets behind 
agendas that largely reflect UK authored development objectives.  In short, the 
EU has allowed the UK to share the costs of punching above its weight in 
international development.  
 
Brexit, the Divorce Bill and ongoing aid commitments  
 
Despite the advantages afforded by the joint provision of development aid, 
there was little explicit discussion of this in either the preliminary debates in 
preparation for triggering of Article 50 nor in the early stages of the Brexit 
negotiations. This is surprising given the significance of outstanding aid 
commitments in the calculations of the Brexit ‘divorce bill’. The UK has spending 
commitments to the 11th EDF until 2020, and importantly in the context of 
quantifying the costs of leaving, these spending obligations are due in 2018 
(which for the UK amounts to £4.5 Billion). There are however no provisions 
within the EDF to deal with the exit of a contributor state, although in the case 
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of accession the contributions of other member states can be amended by a 
Council decision.  
 
Post-referendum there were some indications that the UK would meet its 
existing commitments to the EDF. The Department for Exiting the European 
Union (2017) stated in relation to commitments to structural and investment 
funds, which if they were in place before the Autumn statement of 2016, the UK 
Government would continue to fully fund, ‘even when these projects continue 
beyond the UK’s departure from the EU” (DEEU 2017). May in her 2017 Florence 
Speech stated that ‘The UK will honour commitments we have made during the 
period of our membership’ (2017). Moreover, given that a failure to do so would 
see a significant shortfall in funding (15% in the case of the EDF) May’s additional 
statement that she did not want the UK’s partners ‘to fear that they will need to 
pay more or receive less over the remainder of the current budget plan as a 
result of our decision to leave’ was also be an important indicator of the UK’s 
intent (May 2017). This position was confirmed in the EU and UK Joint Statement 
in December 2017 (EU Commission 2017) which confirmed that the 
implementation of the EU budgets would continue as if the UK had remained in 
the Union; that the UK would remain party to the EDF and would honour its 
commitments made under the current and previous EDFs; and the ‘existing 
modalities of payments’ would be maintained unless otherwise agreed in the 
second phase of negotiations. Also that the UK’s stake in the EIB will overtime 
be repaid.  
 
This pragmatic response to maintaining ongoing aid commitments is perhaps 
unsurprising given the complexity of the provision and that the policy 
interventions already in action are dependent on contributions from UK Aid. In 
the case of the EDF in particular, UK departure before 2020 would have been 
difficult as contributions are ‘underpinned by a binding system which includes 
joint institutions, and its own international legal basis, the Cotonou Agreement’ 
(Olivie and Perez 2017, p.15).  
 
Exploring the Impact on Future UK-ACP Aid Relations   
 
While the question of aid commitments in the Brexit settlement has seemingly 
been agreed, it is clear that Brexit will have a range of potential impacts on the 
future of UK aid, both in the scope of its relations, the position the UK will occupy 
in global development cooperation mechanisms and in the amount of resources 
available in real terms to support development in the Global South.  
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Some have predicted that Brexit could bring a decrease in UK aid provision. This 
has been reinforced by a campaign within the Conservative Party and parts of 
the UK media to reduce UK aid spending, witnessed by the delivery of a Daily 
Express petition to Theresa May by Conservative MP Rees-Mogg in February 
2017.  Anti-aid sentiment has been compounded by the revelations about 
Oxfam and other development NGOs. In response however May has reaffirmed 
the UK Government’s commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid (The Guardian 
2017, 2018).  Yet at a macro-economic level there is the possibility of the further 
devaluation of the pound, which would negatively impact the value of UK aid 
monies. Moreover, in absolute terms, the amount of aid provided would also be 
affected by a fall in GNI, whether or not this is a direct result of Brexit, while any 
negative effect of Brexit on the UK economy could bring further pressure to 
reallocate resources to domestic spending. Should the UK choose to renege on 
its aid spending commitments, it would not be alone.  Olivie and Perez (2017, 
p.20) cite cuts in twelve DAC and EU Member states donors, including Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain between 2010-15. However, any move from 
the 0.7% of GNI commitment would require modification of its legally binding 
commitment, and would mean a political revision of the UK’s global role. 
 
Alternatively, should the UK continue to maintain its 0.7% commitment, Brexit 
will mean that Britain will have a greater proportion of its existing aid budget 
under its own control. There are a number of choices about how to proceed in 
the post Brexit environment. The UK could concentrate aid provision on existing 
bilateral ties (including individual ACP Commonwealth states), or broaden its 
range of bilateral partners. It could divert funds to other multilateral 
partnerships, including perhaps to collective Commonwealth funds, or decide to 
maintain its development cooperation with the EU and its contributions to the 
existing funding mechanisms, such as to the ACP. Alternatively, it might pursue 
some combination of these options.  
 
Olivie and Perez (2017) have characterized each of these options as either a 
Nationalist, or Realist or Cosmopolitan response, with each have differing 
outcomes and impacts. These characterisations reflect how similar concepts 
have been used to categorise the EU’s policy preferences and paradigm shifts, 
for example in Farrell (2005). These categorisations are extended in a typology 
of critical approaches (realist, constructivist, neo-Gramscian and uneven and 
combined Development perspectives) in Price and Nunn (2017), which in turn 
develops an analysis of the EU-ACP relationship in relation to the material 
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interests and processes that secure market expansion and generalized 
competitiveness, whilst locking in ongoing relationships of inequality.  
 
According to Olivie and Perez (2017), the nationalist response would see the UK 
becoming more inward looking and focused on domestic issues, cutting the aid 
budget (perhaps by as much as 30%) and re-assigning the remaining aid formerly 
channeled through the EU to bilateral programmes.  The realist approach would 
see the UK pursuing a strong individual global role as a way of pursuing its own 
interests, maintaining current aid provision but without EU/UK aid 
collaboration. Lastly the cosmopolitan approach would see the UK maintaining 
its aid budgets and pursuing a globalist pattern of allocation through multilateral 
institutions with the possibility of collaboration and coordination with the EU. A 
more critical reading, however, would locate each of these options within an 
understanding of the material forces underpinning the expansion of global 
markets and competitiveness, and the role of the UK state within these.   
While discursively the ‘realist’ bilateral turn is perhaps the option that accords 
most with the rhetoric of Brexit, materialist readings would emphasise the 
significance placed on securing the benefits for UK business within these 
strategies. For example, before her appointment Patel, the former Secretary of 
State for International Development, argued that DFID ought to be replaced by 
a Department for International Trade and Development ‘to enable the UK to 
focus on enhancing trade with the developing world and seek out new 
investment opportunities in the global race” (Patel quoted in Tapsfield 2016). 
Alongside the positioning of development policy within strategies to address 
global competitiveness, the provision of aid has been increasingly linked to 
‘British capital operating overseas’ and international trade, while some of the 
management of aid has moved to departments other than DFID (such as 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 20). There is now an 
explicit policy discourse focused on UK aid providing support for UK business 
interests and the operation of soft power, with a shift away from social 
development and poverty reduction per se towards an explicit focus on value 
for money, efficiency and ‘narratives, policies, and institutions that elevate 
economic growth as the engine of development’ (Lightfoot et al 2017).  
Should there be a post-Brexit shift towards partnerships focused on existing 
bilateral recipients this would very much narrow the current reach of the UK’s 
global presence. Following DFIDs Bilateral Aid Review there has been a 
significant reduction in numbers of UK bilateral aid recipients from 78 in 
2010/11 to 28 in 2012, with Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria targeted as key 
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recipients of UK bilateral aid in 2014/15 (UKAN 2016). This has allowed the UK 
to focus its bilateral efforts on ‘strategic partners’, rather than a wide-ranging 
global approach to poverty reduction. Whereas previously this narrowing of 
bilateral focus was complemented by a continued commitment to multilateral 
obligations, thereby ensuring the continued significance of UK influence and 
role, this could be lost through Brexit (Price 2016). 
 
Brexit might therefore prompt an expansion of UK bilateral partnerships, in 
order to maintain its position in global development and compensate for the 
loss of influence via the EU (Lightfoot et al 2017).  Currently the EU has 139 
delegations around the world, often in places without UK Embassies or DFID 
offices, as well as 17 ongoing Common Security and Development Policy civilian 
and military missions including 10 in Africa (La Porte et al 2013).  Attempts by 
the UK to expand its range of bilateral partners would require a significant 
investment, increase in administrative capacity and a long process of 
bureaucratic reform (Price 2016, p. 505). 
 
The UK could face pressures to expand its bilateral aid relations with individual 
Commonwealth states. In the post-Brexit environment, the loss of UK influence 
on the EU’s aid budget might mean that certain areas of the ACP Commonwealth 
that are currently provided for via the EU-ACP relationship could fare badly in 
the allocation of EU development finance, particularly non-LDC Commonwealth 
states. As Laporte suggests ‘it might be particularly difficult for the English-
speaking Caribbean to find new allies in Europe that will defend their case in 
Brussels’ (Laporte in ECDPM 2016). Should the post-Brexit EU decide to refocus 
its development cooperation relations, Lightfoot et al. (2017) argue that the UK 
might be pressured into increasing funding to certain states to compensate for 
their loss. However, this move might mean that UK aid provision becomes more 
tightly focused on middle income states, rather than LDCs. While this runs 
counter to previous commitments to poverty reduction, it would cohere more 
clearly with the UK’s stated desire to ensure that aid serves the interests of UK 
capital and supports trade and investment opportunities (Chakrabortty 2016). 
As this would accompany the changing sectoral focus, from social development, 
poverty reduction and humanitarian aid, towards economic infrastructural 
development (Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 20), Brexit could pose a significant threat 
to smaller, less developed ACP states and the poorest sections of the population 
of the Global South more generally.  
 
It seems clear that Brexit will create variegated pressures on different states 
within the ACP Group, dependent on their level of development and historic 
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links with the UK.  This could threaten the existence of the ACP group itself, 
which might seem an increasingly redundant organisation particularly in light of 
the creation of regionally based EPAs. On the whole ACP states, and particularly 
the ACP Secretariat, are committed to maintaining the integrity of the Group 
and their collective unity. It should however also be noted that for some ACP 
states the loss of the UK from the EU partnership and in particular from the 
negotiations on trade, is an opportunity to leverage their position in relation to 
EU (see Langan 2016).  
 
In contrast to a ‘bilateralist’ turn, the UK might seek to maintain or expand its 
multilateral commitments, either by focusing on non-EU partner organisations 
or by continuing to work with the EU, in what Olivie and Perez (2017) describes 
as a ‘cosmopolitan’ position. However, this equation between multilateralism 
and cosmopolitanism is open to critique, not least given the prior discussion of 
the operation of UK power and agency in shaping EU policy and frameworks in 
accordance with its own preferences. Rather than the pursuit of an ethical 
dimension to its foreign policy though collective action, the UK has been able to 
address particular moments in its own position in the global economy through 
specific multilateral initiatives, as exemplified by the accession of the UK to the 
EU in the context of the crisis of competitiveness of the early 1970s. In the 
current context, it is showing considerable interest in new multilateral forums 
such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 
whose ‘rising power’ membership has incentivized the UK to join as an 
opportunity to assert its influence. Participation in such fora enables ‘UK leaders, 
diplomats and civil servants to project direct and indirect influence over 
international norms, debates and policy statements in emerging forums’ 
(Lightfoot et al. 2017). This runs alongside the long running UK commitments to 
a range of multilateral development institutions, with its contributions to the 
World Bank being among the most significant in terms of volume of funding.  
Maintaining the 0.7% GNI aid commitment post-Brexit might mean that the UK 
increases its contribution to the World Bank although this relationship too has 
come under pressure to demonstrate ‘value for money’ and efficiency.  
 
Alternatively, in order to maintain existing provision and ease its departure from 
the EU, the UK might choose to keep its multilateral commitments through 
continued participation in EU development mechanisms. In particular, it might 
chose to continue to fund the EDF as a third party (and/ or coordinate with the 
EU’s broader aid provision). As the EDF has its own legal and institutional basis 
it could ‘be preserved as a pan-European development fund’ (Olivie and Perez 
2017, p. 34). This would ‘keep the doors open’ to the UK, and almost in effect 
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leave the EU-ACP relationship unchanged with ‘business as usual’ maintained by 
the UK staying as a signatory partner to Cotonou. The participation of a non-
member state in EU development policy and mechanisms is possible and has 
been facilitated by recent innovations, particularly delegated cooperation and 
trust funds, which allow non-member states such as Norway and Switzerland, to 
channel their ODA via the EU. These funding innovations allow Member states 
and non-Member States to contribute on either country or thematic initiatives, 
and jointly fund programmes in partner countries. The option of continuing its 
multilateral commitments via the EU would provide a way for the UK to preserve 
its global influence and maintain its voice in EU external relations in some form.  
 
UK continued participation in the EU-ACP relationship reflects what Smith 
(2016) describes as a strategic post-Brexit partnership. This is an alternative to 
the other options facing the UK, that of acting in full cooperation with the EU by 
aligning itself to EU positions in order to maximise its impact (but limiting its 
autonomy), or acting in competition to it. In a strategic partnership, the EU will 
expect the UK to act as a partner not rival. This perhaps sheds some light on 
May’s very explicit focus on partnership in her ‘Florence speech’ in September 
2017. She stated that the UK wanted to ‘work hand in hand with the European 
Union’ (May 2017), and highlighted key concerns in relation to migration and 
terrorism which are increasingly at the forefront of EU development policy.  
 
The timing of Brexit presents some challenges and opportunities in relation to 
the exploring this option. Brexit negotiations are running parallel to the 
renegotiation of the EU-ACP relationship and the formation of the ‘post-
Cotonou 2020 framework’. This might provide an opportunity to develop 
mechanisms that allow the UK to continue to contribute to EU funding 
instruments, such as the transformation of the EDF into a ‘flexible structure of 
regional or thematic-based funds’ (Olivie and Perez 2017, p. 21). As such the UK 
would maintain its longstanding commitment to programmes that currently are 
funded by the EDF. For example it has been a longstanding supporter of the 
African Union-led Peace Support Operation in Somalia (AMISOM) which is 
funded through the EDF via the African Peace Facility (APF). If the UK did not 
continue to support the EDF the African Union would need to organise 
additional or alternative support to fund the mission in Somalia (Volker Hauck, 
Head of Conflict, Security and Resilience Programme cited in ECDPM 2016). 
Mechanisms that continue UK engagement with the EU-ACP would therefore 
likely be welcomed by the ACP Group, which has stated its desire to engage as a 
group with new partners beyond the EU.  
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The UK’s continued participation in the EU-ACP relationship could however be 
problematic. Whether the UK will still be able to shape EU-ACP relations to the 
same degree as a ‘third party’ seems questionable, which could diminish the 
attractiveness of the option. In addition, the UK has historically been against the 
joint programming of aid, and the coordinating role it would give to the 
European Commission (Olivie and Perez 2017, p.34). Lightfoot et al. (2017) note 
that the Commission has been ‘carving itself a role as coordinator of member 
state activities’, and has signaled that it intends to increase its role in this field. 
Given that that UK has tried to avoid the influence of EU institutions on Member 
State’s aid provision, this could hinder future cooperation between the UK and 
the EU.  
The benefits of continued partnership with the UK could be an attractive option 
for the EU. Without existing states agreeing to plug the funding gap left by the 
UK’s departure, the EU faces a real decrease in the volume of its aid and its 
position as a global leader in aid provision. Olivie and Perez (2017) predict Brexit 
would mean the EU losing between 10% and 13% of its world aid share. The EU 
would need to fill the gap left by the UK in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms, and either increase the funding commitments for the remaining 27 states 
or change the remit of its development cooperation. While certain member 
states might feel that this is a moment to replace UK leadership and fill the void 
in aid contributions, this would counter the trend of decreasing aid contributions 
as a proportion of GNI by a significant number of EU member states. The 
difficulties and costs associated with the pursuit of a global role without the UK 
therefore could drive a preference for a coordinated post-Brexit aid 
arrangement. Olivie and Perez (2017, p. 37) state that it is in the EU’s best 
interest to coordinate with the UK and ‘lever the highest amount of UK funding 
possible for EU Instruments”. However, there are some that see Brexit as a 
‘cathartic moment’ for the EU, forcing it to redefine itself and push ahead with 
integration. Undoubtedly without the UK the shape of EU development policy 
will be different, and as Sherriff, Head of the European Extremal Action 
Programme states “EU development policy was in a state of evolution even 
before Brexit, moving to be aligned more with EU self-interest and the SDGs” 
(ECPDM 2016). Brexit therefore might offer opportunity for the EU 27 to 
redefine itself apart from UK interests and preferences.   
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Aid for Trade and the Impact of Brexit.  
In exploring the impact of Brexit on the UK aid relationship, it is important to 
recognise that this cannot be disaggregated from the UK’s future trade 
relationships with the Global South, not least due to the ongoing focus on Aid 
for Trade (AfT) and private sector development.  It is accepted that Brexit will 
involve a fundamental reordering of UK trade relations. The UK accounts for 
12.9% of the EU-28’s exports and 15.2% of the bloc’s imports to/from non-
member countries – which positions the UK as the second biggest EU trade 
partner after Germany (Laporte et al 2016). ‘The UK’s total trade with the 80 
plus developing countries that receive trade preferences from the EU was 
approximately £19 billion in exports and £27 billion in imports in 2015’ (DEEU 
2017). Without the conclusion of new agreements to replace the existing trade 
agreements, these countries will no longer have preferential access to the UK 
market, currently provided by EU free trade agreements, economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) or the EU general system of preferences (GSP), including the 
duty-free quota-free market access under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) 
initiative. While recently Liam Fox, UK Secretary of State for International Trade, 
has admitted that there cannot be a ‘cut and paste’ approach to post-Brexit 
trade agreement, he has announced that the UK is committed to maintaining 
the EBA (BBC 2017), a move which the ODI (2017:6) argues will help the poorest 
countries for which the UK remains an important export destination.  
The UK has been clear about its desire to push forward with the conclusion of 
free trade agreements with partners across the world.  
By leaving the EU we will have the opportunity to strike free trade 
agreements with countries around the world. We will be champions of 
free trade driving forward liberalisation bilaterally, as well as in wider 
groupings, and we will continue to support the international rules based 
system (DEEU 2017).  
The White paper outlines the UK’s intention to begin discussions with EU current 
trade partners ‘so as to deliver maximum continuity and certainty for businesses 
once we leave, as well as to ensure continued preferential arrangements for 
developing countries’ (DEEU 2017).  
However, the UK might adopt a more selective approach to the conclusion of 
FTAs than the EU has, due to the historic structures of trade and a desire to avoid 
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the more contentious areas of negotiations. This casts a particular light on the 
increased UK interest in the development of Intra-Commonwealth trade, which 
in 2014 was valued at $700 billion (DEEU 2017). In March 2017, the UK hosted 
an inaugural Commonwealth Trade Ministers Meeting, which agreed proposals 
for the development of the structures to support intra Commonwealth trade. It 
also included an ambitious “Agenda for Growth’ to increase intra-
Commonwealth Trade to $1trillion by 2020 and to ‘identify new opportunities 
to leverage the ‘Commonwealth Factor’; the shared values, language, legal 
framework and regulatory systems that makes trade costs 19 per cent lower 
between Commonwealth countries’ (Commonwealth Enterprise and 
Investment Council 2017).  Liam Fox (cited in Commonwealth Enterprise and 
Investment Council 2017) stated that the Commonwealth “has the opportunity 
to lead the defence of free trade, working together to shape new policies and 
approaches, showing the world a route to prosperity that lies through 
partnership, not protectionism.”  
 
Within the raft of commitments there was little explicit mention of the role of 
aid apart from broad commitments to support trade facilitation, an enabling 
business environment, infrastructural development and the Commonwealth 
Small State Trade Finance Facility (Commonwealth 2017). However, recent 
analysis by the ODI suggests that AfT brings ‘indirect benefit to providers of aid’ 
by stimulating bilateral exports, which more than offset the initial costs 
(Mendex-Parra et al 2017, p.6).  
Careful econometric analysis for the UK suggests that every pound of UK 
aid leads to 22 pence increase in UK exports. Given that the UK provided 
around £5.1 billion of bilateral aid, this has led to an increase in UK exports 
by almost £1.1 billion (Ibid). 
In this context, the possibilities of increased aid provision to the particular states 
in the Global South appears probable, particularly in light of DFID’s expressed 
focus on “value for money’ and supporting UK interests.  
 
Conclusion  
The debate surrounding the Brexit referendum, the subsequent UK-EU 
negotiations and particularly the quantification of the ‘divorce bill’ have 
significant implications for UK aid. Through a focus on aid, this article has 
highlighted how membership of the EU has provided the UK with a powerful role 
in global and regional development cooperation frameworks and that 
participation in EU aid provision has proved to be both effective in the projection 
of UK interests and has represented ‘value for money’. In light of this, the 
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discussion of the Brexit divorce bill has paid little attention to the issue of aid 
and obscures the funding commitments that the UK has itself made to its 
development partners. While the indications seem to point to the UK meeting 
those indications in the immediate term, in the longer term there are a number 
of possibilities and uncertainties in relation to the impact of Brexit on the future 
of UK aid relationships. This has not been given much formal clarification in 
either the debates surrounding the Brexit referendum nor in the Brexit 
negotiations. What is certain however is that the outcomes of Brexit will 
determine the structure of the UK’s relationship with the Global South as a 
whole, and the ACP and Commonwealth in particular. While the option of 
‘business as usual’ and the UK’s continued participation in the EU development 
cooperation relations is a possibility, it is not a certainty. Should Brexit mean 
Brexit for the UK in EU development aid provision, this could mean a significant 
increase in the possible levels of UK aid that are directly under its own control. 
However, this would be dependent on the UK maintaining its commitment to its 
current levels of aid. While this increased national control might suit the present 
UK government’s political stance and its desire to support UK business interests 
through its aid policy, this might come at the cost of its global influence, reach 
and role.  
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